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An American Response to the Trigger Price
Mechanism
by Warren F. Schwartz*
T IS IMPOSSIBLE to evaluate the trigger price mechanism (TPM)
without first considering what objectives were sought to be accomplished by
its adoption. To do this one must begin by defining the purposes of the anti-
dumping laws which TPM is designed to implement. Unfortunately, these
purposes are both obscure and ill-conceived. The deliberations which preceded
the adoption of TPM and much of the subsequent discussion as to its effec-
tiveness have suffered from this basic confusion about goals, which derives
fundamentally from the absence of a coherent theory justifying the prohibi-
tions embodied in the antidumping law.
The antidumping law does not prevent all "sales at less than fair value,"
only those causing the requisite "injury." Thus the law contemplates that in
some circumstances sales in the American market at a price below the home
market price or some alternative reference price are not unlawful. A coherent
theory for distinguishing the lawful conduct from unlawful conduct could be
based either on systematic differences in the behavior of the firms making the
sales at less than fair value, or on some general conception of those adverse
consequences to domestic firms which are to be accepted in the interests of
national and international efficiency, as opposed to those which are to be
avoided even at the price of foregoing the gains of trade which can be
secured through efficient specialization. The antidumping laws, however, em-
body no defensible general conception either as to why the behavior of the
foreign firms is "bad" or as to why the adverse consequences to American
firms and workers should be held to outweigh the greater overall national
gain obtainable from allowing free trade. In particular, if the focus is on the
consequences to American firms and workers, no good reason has ever been
advanced as to why such consequences should be viewed differently if foreign
rivals happen to be practicing price discrimination. Despite the existence of a
wide range of protective and compensatory measures for domestic interests
adversely affected by international trade, there has been no reason advanced
as to why such consequences require greater governmental intervention in cases
where harm has been caused by international competition than in cases where
harm has resulted from domestic competition.
From the point of view of the desirability of prohibiting price discrimina-
tion by firms competing in the American market because this conduct is
harmful to the overall national interest of the United States, the anti-
dumping laws are equally unjustified. I believe that there is no reason to pro-
hibit international competition characterized by lower prices being charged in
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the export market than in the home or some third country market, absent a
finding that the price discrimination is being carried on as a predatory device
to impair competition and ultimately capture monopoly profits. In the
absence of such a finding, the existence of the different prices is perfectly
compatible with profit maximizing conduct of the foreign firm uninfluenced
by an expectation that monopoly profits may be earned. The practice is,
moreover, efficiency enhancing. It is also clear that predatory price
discrimination in markets like the American steel market, for which there is a
large number of suppliers located throughout the world, is a tactic which is
extremely unlikely to succeed.
The antidumping laws, in any event, are not limited to instances of
predatory pricing. While the full reach of the law is difficult to define, it cer-
tainly extends well beyond cases of predatory pricing.
Since the circumstances justifying the imposition of an antidumping duty
are so ill-defined, domestic interests understandably invoke these laws
whenever a colorable case of price discrimination can be made out and the
industry is losing a significant portion of the market to its foreign com-
petitors. The effectiveness of this remedy is, however, limited in a number of
ways. Most obviously, the necessity of establishing that price discrimination
has occurred, that it is the price discrimination which has caused the injury
which the industry has suffered, and that such injury is sufficient to satisfy
the statutory requirement are serious limitations when the real aim of the
domestic industry is to secure protection from more efficient foreign rivals. In
addition to the basic difficulty that these substantive requirements may not be
satisfied, there is the further problem that it is costly to decide whether they
have been met. Given the limited resources of the enforcement agency, not
all cases are brought. Some allocation of decisional resources in relation to
the importance of the proceeding is necessary, and delay in processing cases is
unavoidable. For all these reasons, the tying of protection to the existence of
price discrimination and its effects on the domestic industry limits the effec-
tiveness of the antidumping laws as a protectionist device.
TPM was designed to respond to the difficulties inherent in the anti-
dumping laws. It sets the costs of Japan, the most efficient producing coun-
try, as a floor, with the expectation that sales below the costs of the Japanese
industry will lead to an expedited antidumping proceeding. This seems to me
to raise two equally unfortunate possibilities.
First, if the trigger price is really set to reflect costs as a businessman
would conceive them in deciding whether to accept a price offered, and the
costs as thus defined of the Japanese industry are correctly ascertained, the
device should be wholly ineffective. By definition, no one is going to sell
below the costs of the most efficient producer. If this is so, TPM will have
little or no effect and the administrative costs of having it will be entirely
wasted.
Second, the possibility is that by requiring an allocation of fixed costs
which would not be followed by a profit maximizing firm or in the averaging
of the costs of various Japanese firms, the costs will be computed so as to set a
trigger price above the price at which some significant portion of the inter-
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STEEL DUMPING CONFERENCE
national steel industry is prepared to sell its products. If this is done, then
protection is being afforded the domestic industry. This is, however, objec-
tionable, first as a disguised form of protection which is incompatible, in
spirit at least, with the United States GATT obligations, and second as less
desirable from the American point of view than a tariff since the foreign
firms charge a higher price in the American market and pay nothing to the
American government. Finally, to the extent that the device deters sales
below trigger price that are not also "at less than fair value," it goes beyond
the statutory authority for the program.
What I fail to understand from Mr. Anawaty's presentation is the govern-
ment's view of what TPM is supposed to do. He points to variations in the
amount of steel imported before and after the introduction of TPM.
However, how is one supposed to know whether these variations are desirable
or undesirable? Presumably, the legitimate impact of TPM is limited to instances
of price discrimination which would violate the antidumping laws. How does Mr.
Anawaty have any idea whether the changes which have occurred
reflect more or less of the conduct which is the legitimate concern of the anti-
dumping laws or whether they are the product of the undifferentiated protec-
tionist impact of setting a floor on the price of imported steel?1 (Indeed, dur-
ing the discussions at this conference it was suggested that the real explana-
tion of any reduction in imports is the decision of the Japanese steel industry
to reduce its exports to the United States.)
I should like to conclude my discussion of TPM by pointing out some of
the serious administrative difficulties which arise even if one assumes its basic
legitimacy. The first basic difficulty is that if the device is not to be a wholly
unrestrained protectionist device, some effort to relate the practices of the
foreign suppliers to the requirements of the antidumping laws will have to be
made. Nothing in TPM makes this any easier. All of the complexities which
faced Treasury in proceeding individually before TPM will reoccur if sales
below TPM lead to a proceeding against particular foreign suppliers. The
other basic difficulty of TPM is the endless struggle to classify products in
order to avoid evasion of the TPM prices. Steel producers can, for example,
integrate forward into products containing steel. If this is successful, not only
will the domestic steel industry lose out, but so too will those American in-
dustries which are supplanted by foreign rivals who enjoy the advantage of
having access to cheaper steel.
The reasons why international free trade is a good idea seem so obvious
and compelling to me that it is difficult to articulate them without assuming
the disagreeable tone of the moralist who is terribly certain of the soundness
of his position. But what is ultimately at stake here is whether we will make
the world wealthier by letting each country allocate its resources so as to
realize the comparative advantages of putting them to their most efficient
use, or poorer by protecting American steel workers and entrepreneurs from
I See Anawaty, The United States Legal Response to Steel Dumping, 2 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 60
(1979).
1979]
3
Schwartz: An American Response to the Trigger Price Mechanism
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1979
80 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 2:77
foreign rivals who are better at doing the job. The issue is often confused by
pointing to losses of jobs or closing of plants in the domestic industry without
inquiring whether the overall welfare' of the nation is increased by the
reallocation of the resources. But the conclusion is really inescapable that if
the foreign supplier offers the goods at a lower price, the opportunity cost
abroad must be less than the opportunity cost in the United States and there
are therefore gains of trade to be shared by the trading partners. We may
choose not to realize these gains because we posit some stated number of steel
workers or steel firms or steel plants as an independently desirable aim of na-
tional policy. But if we do this we should be clear about it, acknowledge the
cost to consumers and taxpayers, and not confuse the issue with the existence
of sales "at less than fair value"-as if that for some reason were a bad thing.
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